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The idea that the quality of local public goods is fully capitalized into property values has been considered to be 
the th巴oreticalbasis of imposing the property tax on resid巴nts.The purpose of this paper is to examine this idea. A 
metropolitan area model is first set up， and the model is modified to include the relation between the provision 
level of local public good and tax rate. A small司opencity model and a closed-city model are discussed in 
connection with the tax liability in the aforementioned m巴tropolitanarea model framework. 
1. Introduction 
zation is different in the two cases. 
Property tax is imposed on residents as the liability Under the benefit view， fiscal differentials (the 
of provision of local public goods. The theoretical present value of al future differences between 
basis of imposing property tax on residents is that the benefits received and taxes paid on a property) are 
quality of local public goods is fully capitalized into capitalized into land values. In contrast， under the new 
property value. view， capitalization reflects the change in land rents 
Recently a drastically different perspective on the that occurs as a result of capital migration induced by 
巴ffectsof the property tax is provided by the so-called tax differentials relative to the national average. 
new view of the property tax， which holds that the Further the expenditure increases in a single commu-
property tax is not an efficient ben巴fittax but a nity would result in capitalization of the associated 
distortionary tax on capital that is borne primarily by fiscal differ巴ntials，but should not change the aggre 
capital owners (See Mieszkowski and Zodrow， 1989). gate value of land in the community under the benefit 
Most of the empirical research in this area has focused view. In contrast， under the new view， the capital 
on the extent to which property taxes and local out-migration induced by im increase in the property 
government expenditures are capitalized into house tax should result in lower land values in the commu-
values. nity. 
Assuming a long-run equilibrium with perfectly The purpose of this paper is to examine this 
mobile individuals， capitalization is likely to occur property tax problem again. In our paper a metro-
under both views， i.e.， the benefit view and the new politan model will be used instead of a regional model 
view， of the property tax. However the nature of capitali (see Hagihara and Hagihara， 1991) for a simpli-
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fication. corresponds to a closed-city model framework， in 
Tiebout's classic paper (see Tiebout， 1956) is cited which residents' mobility is restricted， whereas a 
as the paper in which the local finance is considered long-run model framework corresponds to an open-
from the viewpoint of the relation between local public city model framework， where perfect mobility is 
expenditure and residents' preference.Tiebout showed assumed. Nevertheless， there is an inconsistant as 
that the problem of inefficient provision of a pure sumption ; that is， perfect mobi¥ty is assumed in the 
public good in an 巴conomy with heterogeneous short-run model 
consumers， raised in Samuelson (1954)， would be In our paper， the problem whether the quality of 
mitigated by the Tiebout hypothesis， that is consumers local public goods is fully capitalized or not is 
have an incentive to segregat巴 intohomogeneous investigated under consistent assumptions， i. e.， 
communities by tast巴andincome， where public goods perfect mobility is assumed in the long-run model and 
are provided efficiently. no migration is assumed in the short-run model. 
Oates (1969) showed the validity of the Tiebout According to the classification in our paper， the 
hypothesis， by examining the empirical study of the extemal and intemal models which Starrett (1981) 
effects of local property taxes and local expenditure showed is the long-run model and the short-run model， 
programs on property values. The result of the study respectively. Furthermore， the effect of the tax liability 
indicated that local property values bear a significant on property values in both the open-city model and the 
negative relationship io the effective tax rate and a closed-city model framework is considered. 
significant positive correlation with exp巴nditureper In section 2 below a mtropolitan area mod巴lis set up 
pupil in the public schools. and a bid r巴ntcurve (see， e.g. Alonso， 1964) is 
The problem that the output of public services (as introduced. In section 3， the model is modified to 
well as tax巴s)influence the attraction of a community include the relation between the provision level of 
to potential residents and thereby affect local property local public goods and th巴 taxrate. In section 4， a 
values is studied by many巴conomists;e.g.，Brueckner small-open city model and a closed-city model are 
(1979)， Edel and Sclar(1974)， Hamilton (1976)， King discussed in connection with the tax liability. In 
(1977 
and Henning's (1967) study， there has be巴ngrowmg 
interest in using property value data as a sourc巴 of
2. Residential Choice 
information on the benefits to be expected from Consider a simple mod巴lof residential choice in 
controlling environmental disamenities such as air which the following assumptions will be introduced. A 
pollution， water pollution， and nois巴 e.g. Polinsky fixed population lives in a closed metropolitan 紅白
and Shavell (1975 and 1976) and White (1979) ， etc. and they are partition巴dinto R exogenous govern-
Along with these studies th巴rehas been continuing mental jurisdictions， denoted by the set J = {1，…， R} 
controversy and debate ov巴rthe proper th巴oretical which collect taxes and provide public goods. An 
framework for the analysis of property values:some individual consumes the public goods only of the 
argues tte theoretical framework from the viewpoint jurisdict削 1to which he belongs. Letιdenote the 
of the short-run aspect. A short-run model framework vector of public goods provided by jurisdiction j. The 
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number of residents residing in the jurisdiction is NJ that， al other things being equal， a rational individual 
and the amount of residential land in the j-th juris- will prefer a mor巴 accessiblelocation to a lees 
diction is DJ . Each resident must occupy one and only accessible one. Since t represents the dist加 cefrom the 
one place， and his income， y， isindependent of his CBD， and thus the distance the individual must 
place. Residents have identical tastes and income. commute to the principal place of shopping， amuse 
Taxes are raised through a tax proportinal to the rent. ment， and employment， itmay be said that accessi-
The price of the composite private good is assumed bility d巴creaseas t increases. In other words， the 
invariant throughout the metropolitan area and is set at individual would prefer t to be smaller rather than 
unity. Land is assumed to b巴theonly input into the larger， so that t may be thought of as a good with 
production of housing; the land is owned by agents negative utility. 
living outside of the metropolitan area， and it is The budget equation for a representative individual 
supplied perfectly inelastically within each juris- is as follows: 
diction. Jurisdictions lie at various distance from a 
(2) central business district (CBD) in the metropolitan y = x + RJq + k(υ 
area， where there are many common public services to 
the residents in the metropolitan area and the distance where 
is taken to be id巴nticalfor al places in a given y = income; 
jurisdiction. The commuting costs from the j-th Rj = rent in the j-th jurisdiction; 
jurisdiction to the CBD will increase with distance k(ゆ=transportation cost from the j-th jurisdiction to 
from the CBD. These costs will be represented by the the CBD‘ 
function k(tj ). The residential choice for a representative resident 
Given these assumptions， the utility function for a may be stated as 
representative individual is denoted by 
U = U (x， q， gj ，。
where 
x = consumption of a composite private good; 
q = consumption of housing; 
gj = quality of local public goods in the j-th 
jurisdiction; 
tJ = distance from the CBD to the j-th jurisdiction. 
It is assumed that 
Ux > 0， Uq > 0， Ugj> 0， and Utj< 0 
All other things being equal， the individual will prefer 
to have more than les of the public good. Assume 
Max U (x， q， g;， tj) subject to y = x + Rjq + k(tJ). (3) 
???
The indirect utility function is introduced. A 
residents' utility is expressed as a function of income 
net of transportation costs from the j-th jurisdiction， 
rent at the j-th jurisdiction， quality of local public good 
at jurisdiction j， and distance from jurisdiction j to the 
CBD. Since the indirect utility function is related to 
each specific location， the price of the composite 
consumption good do巴snot enter into it since this price 
is assumed to be the same everywhere. The indirect 
utility function is 
V = v (y-k(tふR;， g;， tJ) (4) 
All other things being equal， an increase in net income 
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increases utility; an increase in rent decreases utility;an The sign of dRj /dtj is negative when tj increases， 
increase in quality of local public goods increases other things being equal， jurisdiction is a less 
utility an increase in distance decreases utility. accessible one and commuting cost rises. When 
Namely， assume that commuting cost rises， less income is left expenditure 
on x， and R， must fal to allow the individual to 
V，>O，V，く0，V3 > 0， and V4 < 0， (5) maintain his x consumption. When incom巴incr巴ases，
Rj increases. Since utility increases with quality of 
where V， denotes partial derivative of V's first local public goods， R， must rise to allow the 
element， and so on. individual to maintain his x consumption. 
It is assumed that an individual chooses to reside in 
the community where it can attain the highest level of 
utility:i.e.， the jurisdiction j for which maXj V (y-k(t， 
)， Rj ， gJ，tj is attained. An individual's bid rent 
function is defined as that the resident would offer for 
jurisdiction j， given some indifference level V" . That Property tax is introduced. Property tax is levied on 
3. Local Expenditure and Tax 
Liability 
is， V" must satisfy the following巴quation: land values at a constant tax rate，α， i.e.， 
V (y -k(tふR，， gj， tj ) -V" = 0 (6) Rj =rj (1+α， ) (12) 
where 
From Eqs. (6)， the resident's bid for jurisdiction j is
r， = land values in jurisdiction j; 
R， =f(V" ， Y -k(tj )， g， ， t) .αj = property tax rate in jurisdiction j. 
(7) The budget equation for a representative individual is 
Though the form of the bid rent curve cannot be denoted by 
stated exlicitly without knowing the form of the utility 
function， characteristics of the bid rent curve can be y==x+r，(I+α， ) q+ k(tj ). 
stated as follows. Using Eqs. (4)， the following 
equation is derived from dV =0: 
(13) 
The indirect utility function is 
V.I生I-V.
1 ldt，J .... V.. V dRj = 一 "'U~J" 一一 dtj - :，' dy -:，3 dg V
2 
~'J V
2 
~J V
2 
V =V (y -k(t，) r， (1+ a J )， gj ， tj ). 
(14) 
We have: 
rdkl v. I-:~'I -V. 金.• l血L一二.，-{¥
dtj V2 
Similarly as abov巴， It IS assum巴dthat 
(9) 
V，>O， V，く0，V3 > 0， and V4くO.
dR， V. 'ー"ー::>0 dt V2 
?????
(15) 
And we have 
dRj V3_ ^  
dgj V2 -
????
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V，I生1-V. drj ldもj
dも V2+ V;Ilj 、 v
where Dj isthe amount of residential land in the j-th 
(16) jurisdiction. If each local govemment balances its 
budget， then: 
? ??
? ??
? ? (17) 
drj V. 、 A
dgj V2 + V;Ilj - ~ ( 18) 
C， (gj) Nj =αjrjD， (23) 
drj V1 _ ^  
dy V2 + V;Ilj - ~ 
Defining n， = NJ fDj ， the rent， R， = r， (1+αJ 
(υ19助 becomes n叫jC巳， (匂gιω，)+ rj (24) 
Eqs. (24) shows the rent when property tax rate is 
The sign of drJ /dα， isnegative because when the c10sely related to the provision of local public goods. 
property tax rate increases， less of the fixed rent Rj is Then the budget constraint of a representative 
available to the owner， and land values fals. Other individual is 
signs is the same as before. 
y = x + {nj Cj (gj) + r， 1 q + k (tj). (25) Equilibrium state where any resident cannot in-
crease utility by migration， isattained when market 
values of land is decided such that al residents' utility The indirect utility function is 
is equal. Hence， land values in equlibrium market is 
a decreasing function of distance， t， ， and property tax v = V (y-k (tJ)， nj C， (gJ) +九 g;，tj) (26) 
rate，αJ ， and an increasing function of quality of local and assume that 
public， gj， and income， y.
V，>0，V2く0，V3 > 0， and V4くO.The budget constraint of the local govemment is 
introduced. Suppose that the cost， C， ， ofproviding the 
public goods is an increasing function of the quality of Then we have 
Ica1 public goods， gj， and the number of residents in 
the jurisdiction， N，: 
CJ = C (gj ， n，) (20) 
The cost function is assumed to exhibit " constant 
retums to scale": 
C， = Cj (g，) NJ (21) 
Local tax revenue， T， ， israised through a proportional 
tax，αj ， on the value of land: 
TJ=αjf1D1 (22) 
? ?
??
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
?? ?
(27) 
(28) 
??〉
?
? ?? ?? ??
? ? ? ?
(29) 
The ambiguous sign of drjdgj is due to 
V. _ dC， 
two opposing effects. When :，' > n ー~， the V
2 
~ Uj dg
j 
resident desired the increase of local public goods (or 
dC，-V. the increase of liability) . However， when nj-:~'>ーヱ，'dgj' V2 
he desires the decrease of local public goods(or the 
decrease of liability). 
Given other variables， marginal utility of gj is 
decreasing with increas巴ofg; .There is a point where 
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the decrease of utility which is caused by the increase diction makes utility incr巴ase(Y弓>0)， whereas land 
of liability is not covered. If there is such a point， values change in order to hold y' constant. Land 
given some tJ， a curve which increases with gj and values rise as being shown in Eqs. (15) ， so that the 
after some point it decreases with increase of gj. decrease in utility (y，く0)offsets the increase inutility 
(y， > 0) . And y' is hold constant. Thus， utility of 
4. Migration of Residents 
4. 1 The open city and the constant tax 
rate 
To fix the l巴velof utility， the urban ar開 isassumed 
to be small and open. Since the area is open -there is 
perfect migration between it and other ar巴as一， there 
residents does not change， whereas the benefits from 
the increase in the quality of local public goods is 
capitalized into the land values 
4. 2 The open city and the closed 
relationship between the provision of 
local public goods and the tax rate 
will be a common level of utility throughout the Similarly to the above， land values change in order to 
system. Because the city is small， this level of utility hold utility constant. In equilibrium， a common lev巴l
may be treated as巴xogenous. of utility is 
In equilibrium， land values display a pattern such 
that none of th巴 identicalindividuals could increase 
their utility by changing r巴sidence.Each individual 
y2 = Y(y -k (tJ) ， nJCJ (gj) + rj ， gj， tj). (31) 
enjoys a common level of utility， Y'， which is rJ changes to offset the effect of the increase of gj (Y， 
ind巴pendentof his location: > 0). In this case， however， the increase in quality of 
local public goods is connect巴dwith the increasing 
y' = Y(y -k(tふrj(1 +αふgJ'tJ) (30) liability of the residents through rent， nJCJ (gj) +町
Therefore， since the offset effect in the increase of rent 
Adjustment in land values is the mechanism by which involves a part of the increase of tax liability， rj may 
utility is equalized over space. If jurisdiction A， is rise or fal or may not change according to the extent 
more attractive than jurisdiction A， ， consid巴ringthe of tax liability. This is the case in which Eqs. (28) 
rent， the quality of th巴localpublic goods， and distance occurs. And the case of drj /dgJ < 0 co汀巴spondsto the 
at both places， then rents at A， are bid up and rents A， empirical result in Oates (1969) in which he showed 
fal until A， and A， become equally desirable. This that high property tax rate lower巴dthe property value. 
process occurs throughout the metropolitan area， 
generating the巴quilibriumrent schedule. As income， 4. 3 The closed city and the constant tax 
transportation cost， and the quality of local public rate 
good are given， there is only one land value which 
brings utility， y' . Inoth巴rwords， inthis case， since y' The object of this analysis is short-run. It does not 
IS exog巴nouslyfixed， the change of the quality of allow migration to or from the jurisdiction. The 
local public goods gives no effect on y' . The increase 巴quilibriumcondition， analogous to (30)， is
in the qual町 oflocal public goods in some juris-
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V3 = V(y -k(tふrj(1+αムg"t;) (32) 
4. 5 Intermediate cases 
for some V3 to be determined. 1ntermediate cases between the purely closed and 
The equilibrium level of utility V3 is now endogenous jmrely open cities might in fact be more relevant for 
since the jurisdiction is isolated from the rest of the policy pu中oses.
system. While utility of the residents increases by an 1n the fiI'st place， in the case of the constant tax 
increase in gJ ， the increase in gj is not capitalized into rate， an increase in gj makes both residents' utility and 
land values. For， no migration occurs， so that land aggregate land values increased. However， an increase 
values cannot adjusted by residents' mobility. The in residents' utility is not fully capitalized into land 
aggregate land values in the jurisdiction understat巴 values，so that aggregate land values understate 
the benefits from the increase in gj . 1n an opposit巴 benefits.Since benefits are more capitalized into land 
case， namely， the case of a decrease in gJ ， land values values in the long-run situation than in the short-run， 
overstates the benefits from the decrease in gJ・ thepublic investment in local govemment becomes 
4. 4 The closed city and the closed 
relationship between the provision of 
local public goods and the tax rate 
The equilibrium condition in this case is 
efficient in the long-run situation according to Brueck-
ner' s fiscal effici巴ntcondition， viz. public investment 
in local govemment is efficient so as to make the 
aggregate land values maximum (see Brueckner， 
1979). 
Secondly， the case of the closed relationship 
between the provision of local public goods and th巴tax
V4 = V(y -k(tJ )， nJ Cj (gj) +rj ， gJ， tj) (33) rate is concemed. 1n the case where tax liability is so 
large by th巴 incr，巴asein local public goods， both 
for some V4 to be determined. residents' utility and land values decreases. The 
Utility of residents increase with an increase in gJ ， decrease in residents' utility is capitalized into land 
wh巴reasresidents' utility decreases with an increase in values. However， since the increase in local public 
tax liability， nJCj (gJ)' Utility of residents may increase， goods brings no benefit， the local govemment invests 
decrease or not change， depending on cases in which inefficiently. On the other hand， inthe case which tax 
IV31 islarger thanlV，I， IV21 islarger than IV31 and IV21 is liability is not so large， utility of residents increases. If 
equal to IV，I， resspectively. Since the residents do not land values increase with the increase of utility， then 
move at al， rJ does not change. Thus， inthe case where benefits are capitalized into land valu巴s.1n this case 
the increase of utility by the increase in gj is so large the local gov巴mm巴ntinvests efficiently. 
that it offsets the decrease of utility by the increase in 
tax liability， V4 increases. But since rj does not change， 
the change in aggregate land values will understate 
5. Concluding Remarks 
benefits. On the contrary， in the opposite case， the No matter whether the constant tax rate or not， the 
chang巴inaggregate land values will ovestate benefits. result of each case varies depending on whether the 
ful adjustment of land values is done or not. 1n other 
words， availability of residents' mobility changes the 
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adjustment mechanism of land valus. When the 
adjustment mechanism works sufficientIy， the quality 
of local public goods is fully capitalized into property 
values in a small-open model. However， in the 
closed-city model and the open-city model with tax 
liability， the quality of local public goods is not fully 
capitalized into property values. Land values may both 
understate and overstate quality of local public goods 
In the intermediate cases， the quality of local public 
goods is somewhat capitalized into land valus， but is 
not fully captalized. Since， ingeneral， we do not know 
whether the land value effects of the local public goods 
are an over-or under-estimate of its benefits， the 
benefits of the local public goods cannot be measured 
by its effects on land values. Consequently， the 
property tax is not considered to be a tax on 
beneficiary. 
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要約
地域的公共財の質は資産価値に完全に資本化されるという考えが住民に対して資産税を課
する理論的根拠となっている。しかし、この考えについては理論的に多くの研究者によって
疑問がなげかけられている。本考察の目的はこの考えを理論モデルを整理して再度検討する
ことである。
都市圏モデルをまず設定し、このモデルを地域的公共財の供給水準と税率の関係を考慮し
たモデルに拡張する。開放型小都市モデルと閉鎖型モデルを上記の都市圏モデルによって税
負担との関連で議論する。その結果、資本化は認められるものの地域的公共財の質が場合に
よって過大に評価されたり過少に評価される可能性があり、地域的公共財の便益評価には注
意を払う必要がある。したがって、理論的には資産税を応益税とみなすことが難しいことに
なる。
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